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Shoshana Grossbard 
Repack the Household: A Response to Robert 
Ellickson’s Unpacking the Household 
This is a slightly edited version of a comment that was published in the 
Yale Law Journal Pocket Edition in April 2007. 
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Abstract 
 
I challenge the notion that households can be reduced to housing units. 
Ellickson, a law professor, overemphasized the desirability of ownership from the 
perspective of capital accumulation.  Ownership is also important to the 
household members who do the work that maintains the household, including 
production of meals, homemaking, childcare, eldercare, and other essential 
functions of households. Discouraging home ownership by those who manage the 
details of such essential activities, and who need more rather than fewer 
incentives to engage in household production, is placing more nails in the coffin 
of advanced industrialized societies. 
 
 
In the United States and many other industrialized countries, there is 
much concern that younger generations fail to invest the amount of 
household production time that is needed for society to reproduce itself and 
for children to receive the education that will make them into productive 
citizens.1 In either instance, levels of household production of socially 
desirable goods and services may be suboptimal.2 Robert Ellickson’s 
 
1.  According to the CIA, it was estimated in 2006 that 93 countries out of 222 had total 
fertility rates below the rate of 2.1 necessary for society to reproduce itself. The United 
States had a total fertility rate of 2.09. See CIA, The World Factbook, Rank Order: 
Total Fertility Rate, 
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2127rank.html (last visited 
April 13, 2007). 
2.  For instance, from the perspective of younger workers contributing to social security 
systems, see Shirley Burggraf, Marriage, Parental Investment, and the Macroeconomy, in 
MARRIAGE AND THE ECONOMY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM ADVANCED 
INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETIES 318, 319 (Shoshana A. Grossbard-Shechtman ed., 2003). 
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emphasis on conditions optimal for capital supply,3 but not for the supply 
of household labor, could reinforce these trends and further discourage some 
socially desirable household production. 
Ellickson’s theme is that households can be “unpacked” in the sense 
that they can be restricted to a real estate dimension: he defines the 
household as a dwelling space where occupants usually sleep and share 
meals.4 Accordingly, much of his article is devoted to real estate issues, such 
as the distinction between occupant and owner, and the determinants of 
home ownership. I focus this Response on one of the article’s major 
implications: the desirability of ownership by suppliers of capital. 
One of Ellickson’s goals is to facilitate the selection of a preferred 
governance system for the household, including a system that optimally 
allocates ownership (that is, rights to make residual control decisions and 
receive residual financial flows). According to him, the following groups of 
people hold a stake in the household’s economy and could potentially be 
granted ownership5: household members who supply household labor; 
household members who contribute equity (in cash or in kind); and 
contributors of capital and labor from outside the household. Together, 
these four groups produce the shelter and meals that are mostly consumed 
by the household’s occupants. Minimization of transaction costs leads 
Ellickson to eliminate outsiders as optimal owners. That leaves two groups 
of potential owners: household members who supply capital, and those who 
supply labor. 
In arguing the advantages of conferring household ownership on the 
suppliers of at-risk capital, Ellickson uses the example of a “sitcom 
household” composed of five occupants: Dad, a widower; Granny, Dad’s 
widowed mother; Maureen, Dad’s divorced daughter; Chip, Maureen’s 
young son; and Nadia, whom Maureen has hired to serve as a live-in nanny 
for Chip. 
Ellickson offers four reasons why household members who contribute 
at-risk capital are more optimally suited for household ownership than 
 
3.  Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226 (2006), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/116/2/226_ 
robert_c_ellickson.html. 
4.  Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 230 (2006), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/116/2/ 
226_robert_c_ellickson.html. 
5.  According to Ellickson, the term “stakeholder” was recommended by Robert Pollak; 
Ellickson uses the term “patron” to describe any party who transacts with a business 
firm. Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 230, 280 n.203 (2006), available at 
http://yalelawjournal.org/116/2/ 
226_robert_c_ellickson.html. 
repack the household 
343 
 
suppliers of labor6: they tend to (1) be few in number and stable in identity; 
(2) bear risks better; (3) be more homogeneous in their interests; and (4) 
place high value on rights of control (because they are highly vulnerable to 
opportunism). Each reason, discussed in turn, is problematic. 
The first reason why capital suppliers are a preferred type of owner is 
that a household’s equity investors tend to be fewer than its occupants. The 
fewer the agents, the lower the coordination costs in decision-making. As a 
result, the two suppliers of equity in the sitcom household can make 
decisions more easily than its four adult occupants. Ellickson does not 
pursue this argument to smaller numbers of occupants. If two is better than 
four, is not one better than two? However, as recognized elsewhere in the 
article,7 it is possible that twosomes coordinate at low costs. Most 
households in the United States are owned by couples, and most 
homebuyers are couples.8 
The second justification that Ellickson offers for ownership by capital 
suppliers is more problematic: 
A risk-averse person is helped by the diversification of her combined 
holdings of human capital and financial capital. An occupant who 
has specialized and nontransferable skills in housework already is 
somewhat invested in the dwelling she occupies. Particularly if she 
has little financial capital, for reasons of diversification she may 
prefer not to have a share of the ownership of the residual financial 
claim in the same dwelling. Other less risk-averse patrons of the 
same household also likely would not want her to serve as an owner. 
For example, if Granny and Nadia were co-owners of the Sitcom 
House and neither had much in the way of savings, they might be 
 
6.  Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 283-87 (2006), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/116/2/ 
226_robert_c_ellickson.html. 
7.  Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 254-56 (2006), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/116/2/ 
226_robert_c_ellickson.html. 
8.  For instance, according to Ellickson, in 1980, almost 70% of Bucks County, 
Pennsylvania, deeds named a husband and wife as co-grantees. Robert C. Ellickson, 
Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 
226, 261 (2006), available at 
http://yalelawjournal.org/116/2/226_robert_c_ellickson.html. According to a 2005 
survey by the National Association of Realtors (NAR), 68% of all homebuyers were 
couples. See id. at 261 n.125. 
the yale law journal pocket part 116:341  2007 
344 
 
overly cautious about taking on more household debt to finance the 
replacement of a leaking roof.9 
This argument implies that if “Ozzie and Harriet” are married and 
occupy the same home, and they agree on a traditional gender-based 
division of labor, the leaking roof is more likely to be repaired if Ozzie owns 
the home by himself than if he and Harriet share ownership. She is likely to 
own less non-human capital than Ozzie, and more of her capital—possibly 
all of it—is likely to take the form of home-specific human capital. Were 
Dad and Nadia, the live-in nanny, to fall in love and marry, the argument 
implies that it is preferable for Dad to remain sole owner of the house. By 
contrast, consider “Bill and Hill,” a hypothetical egalitarian couple who 
have invested little in home production skills, have equal earning power, 
and whose combined income and assets (besides the home) are comparable 
to those of Ozzie. They may be willing to take as much risk as Ozzie, 
assuming they have no costs of coordination. As I discuss further below, 
this explanation of home ownership is problematic because it fails to 
consider the incentives that motivate the supply of labor in the home. 
 Homogeneity of interests, Ellickson’s third justification for ownership 
by suppliers of capital, also implies that Bill and Hill couples are more 
suitable for joint home ownership than Ozzie and Harriet couples. 
Homogeneity of ownership interests facilitates the calculation of shares of 
ownership. “Capital contributions are especially easy to value,” Ellickson 
writes. “This is not the case for labor inputs. . . . If labor were the residual 
claimant in the Sitcom household, for example, the occupants might 
wrangle over the fractional interests that, say, Maureen and Granny should 
be accorded.”10 
Similar considerations follow from Ellickson’s fourth justification for 
ownership by suppliers of capital: vulnerability of suppliers of at-risk 
capital to opportunism by household workers and managers. Suppliers of 
capital are at-risk since “a household worker who feels exploited can exit 
immediately with most of her human capital in tow” and could subject an 
asset to “unduly high risks, say, by skimping on maintenance.”11 Ellickson 
 
9.  Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth 116 YALE L.J. 226, 284 (2006), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/116/2/ 
226_robert_c_ellickson.html. 
10.  Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 285 (2006), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/116/2/ 
226_robert_c_ellickson.html. 
11.  Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 285-86 (2006), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/116/2/ 
226_robert_c_ellickson.html. 
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states that occupants “are likely to recognize that [they can] best minimize 
their overall costs [by] bestowing ownership on those among them who are 
equity investors.” Thus, he seems to estimate that suppliers of capital have 
more to lose from workers’ opportunism and malfeasance than workers have 
to lose from the opportunism and malfeasance of capital suppliers. 
Thus, the four reasons summarized above explain why, “[l]ike 
participants in a business firm, members of a household typically confer 
ownership on providers of at-risk capital, not on occupants who labor 
within the home.”12 The evidence provided in the article consists of (1) 
intentional communities’ implicit recognition of the advantages of 
conferring ownership on providers of capital13 and (2) the predominant 
ownership patterns of conventional households that were originally 
introduced in ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Israel.14 I am concerned 
about the parallels between such ancient households and the Anglo-
American coverture system,15 and don’t see how such evidence can provide 
much guidance for modern households. 
Rather than following Ellickson in viewing married suppliers of 
household labor with no access to capital as willingly bestowing ownership 
on spouses who supply capital, I prefer to see household occupants who 
actually or potentially supply labor in married household economies as 
participants in market and “collective bargaining” processes with household 
occupants who actually or potentially supply capital in these economies.16 
As is the case in monetary economies, suppliers of labor and capital in 
married household economies have different interests to the extent that 
 
12.  Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 233 (2006), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/116/2/ 
226_robert_c_ellickson.html. 
13.  Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 286 (2006), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/116/2/ 
226_robert_c_ellickson.html. 
14.  Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 286-87 (2006) (citing Robert C. Ellickson & Charles DiA. 
Thorland, Ancient Land Law: Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 
354-57 (1995)), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/116/2/226_robert_c_ellickson.html. 
15.  The breakdown of the coverture system is discussed in Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking 
the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 239-40 
(2006), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/116/2/226_robert_c_ellickson.html. 
16.  See SHOSHANA GROSSBARD-SHECHTMAN, ON THE ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE: A THEORY 
OF MARRIAGE, LABOR, AND DIVORCE (1993), available at http://www-
rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty 
/sgs/documents/on_the_economics_of_marriage/table_of_contents.htm. 
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they each want a larger share of the household surplus.17 Such diverging 
interests—exacerbated the more joint household occupancy is expected to 
be of limited duration—help explain why in the United States community 
property states were significantly less likely to enact legislation to overturn 
coverture than states following the common law.18 Under coverture, 
capital-owning husbands did not have to worry about losing control over 
capital in case of divorce. The abolition of coverture involved a 
redistribution of surplus from capital-owning men to homemaking women 
everywhere. However, in a community property state it implied more losses 
to an Ozzie—compelled to attribute half of the marital assets to a Harriet—
than in a common law state, where judges tended to attribute to a divorced 
Harriet less than half the marital assets. Therefore, relative to men in 
common law states, men in community property states were more likely to 
vote against the abolition of coverture. 
Furthermore, Ellickson’s focus on incentives for capital suppliers leads 
him to overlook the role of incentives for suppliers of household labor. 
Ellickson’s second and fourth reasons—(2) capital suppliers will provide 
better maintenance,19 and (4) capital suppliers have incentives to exercise 
control responsibly20—imply that economically rational young men or 
women with capital and stay-at-home spouses will buy homes in their own 
names, and that only employed spouses like Bill and Hill will jointly own 
their homes. Most couple relationships in contemporary liberal societies are 
not of the Bill-and-Hill type: they involve specialization between a 
principal breadwinner/supplier of capital and a principal household 
manager who supplies more labor.21 
 
17.  In the monetary economy this mostly takes the form of a competitive market process 
based on the price mechanism. For a comparison of household economies with monetary 
economies, see Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman, Marriage and the Economy, in 
MARRIAGE AND THE ECONOMY 1, 1-3 (Shoshana A. Grossbard-Shechtman ed., 2003). 
18.  This finding is reported in Rick Geddes & Dean Lueck, The Gains from Self-Ownership 
and the Expansion of Women’s Rights, 92 AM. ECON. REV .1079, 1088 (2002). 
19.  Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 284 (2006), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/116/2/ 
226_robert_c_ellickson.html. 
20.  Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 286 (2006), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/116/2/ 
226_robert_c_ellickson.html. 
21.  Relative to men, women are more likely to work part-time or not at all. For example, 
Current Population Survey data for 2000 indicate that 42.8% of all married U.S. women 
ages thirty to thirty-four were working full-time year-round, whereas this was the case 
of 85.9% of married men ages thirty-two to thirty-six. See Shoshana Grossbard-
Shechtman & Shoshana Neuman, Marriage and Work for Pay, in MARRIAGE AND THE 
ECONOMY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM ADVANCED INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETIES 222, 
224 (Shoshana A. Grossbard-Shechtman ed., 2003). Using data from the Current 
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Whether in the context of firms or households, an optimal governance 
structure needs to protect and motivate workers as well as capital suppliers. 
Workers in household production incur opportunity costs that increase with 
their earning power.22 One expects that the more hours a worker engages in 
household production, and the more she invests in human capital that 
enhances productivity in such production, the higher the compensation she 
requires. I call this compensation the “quasi-wage” for household labor.23 In 
the United States the legal system discourages the supply of household 
work by making it difficult to combine the processes of specialization and 
exchange so prevalent in the monetary economy. The law often dismisses 
implicit household contracts involving the exchange of one spouse’s 
household work for access to the other spouse’s income.24 Ellickson 
reinforces underproduction in household economies and underinvestment in 
the human capital that enhances productivity in marital household 
production by failing to recognize the counterpart to breadwinners’ 
concerns about opportunistic workers: opportunistic breadwinners may 
discontinue implicit household employment contracts.25 One sound 
economic argument for offering home ownership to household workers and 
managers is that being offered access to housing by the breadwinning 
 
Population Surveys of 1972-1973, Philip Cohen found that the percentage of prime-age 
women who classified themselves as “keeping house” stood at 52.8%. See Philip N. 
Cohen, The Gender Division of Labor: “Keeping House” and Occupational Segregation in 
the United States, 18 GENDER & SOC’Y 239, 245-47 (2004). During those years the 
percentage of women ages 16 and older not in the labor force stood at 55.7%, based on 
the average labor force participation rate for women 16 years and over for 1972 and 
1973. See UNITED STATES DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., TABLE 2: 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONAL POPULATION 16 YEARS AND 
OVER BY SEX, 1970-2002 ANNUAL AVERAGES (2005), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-table2-2005.pdf. This suggests a high correlation between 
“women keeping house” and “women out of the labor force.” The last year that the CPS 
asked whether people were keeping house was 1993. See Cohen, supra, at 245-47. 
22.  See Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman, A Theory of Allocation of Time in Markets for Labour 
and Marriage, 94 ECON. J. 863 (1984); SHOSHANA GROSSBARD-SHECHTMAN, ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE: A THEORY OF MARRIAGE, LABOR, AND DIVORCE (1993), 
available at http://www-
rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/sgs/documents/on_the_economics_of_marriage/ 
table_of_contents.htm. 
23.  See SHOSHANA GROSSBARD-SHECHTMAN, ON THE ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE: A THEORY 
OF MARRIAGE, LABOR, AND DIVORCE (1993), available at http://www-
rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/sgs/documents/on_the_economics_of_marriage/table_of_content
s.htm. 
24.  See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005). 
25.  Ellickson recommends unilateral gift exchanges of household service rather than such 
contracts. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property 
Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 248-49 (2006), available at 
http://yalelawjournal.org/116/2/226_robert_c_ellickson.html. 
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spouse is a form of quasi-wage for work in marital household production 
such as meal preparation, lawn care, child care, elder care, and care for 
lovers.26 High levels of joint homeownership by married couples indicate 
that many spouses who principally supply labor—not capital—to the 
household co-own their homes.27 Capital suppliers may thus agree to co-own 
with the people who work for them in their homes as a way to obtain higher 
satisfaction from the home-produced goods they consume. 
Ellickson’s imbalanced emphasis on the rights of capital suppliers at the 
expense of those of household workers could further undermine not only the 
production of meals and homemaking in the unpacked household, but also 
the supply of home-produced childcare, eldercare, and other essential 
functions of households that respond to the proper incentives. Discouraging 
home ownership by those who manage the details of such essential 
activities, and who need more rather than fewer incentives to engage in 
household production, is placing more nails in the coffin of advanced 
industrialized societies. 
 
Shoshana Grossbard is Professor of Economics at San Diego State 
University and editor of the Review of Economics of the Household published 
by Springer. She has published on the economics of marriage in the American 
Economic Review, the Journal of Political Economy, Economic Journal, the 
Journal of Marriage and the Family, and with Cambridge University Press. 
She wishes to thank Howard Charles Yourow, S.J.D. for his valuable help in 
the preparation of this Response, and the editorial staff of The Yale Law 
Journal Pocket Part for their useful comments. 
 
Preferred Citation: Shoshana Grossbard, Repack the Household: A 
Response to Robert Ellickson’s Unpacking the Household, 116 YALE L.J. 
 
26.  I am interpreting as compensation for work in household production the value of home 
equity that household working spouses obtain via marriage beyond what they 
personally contribute to that equity. Another commonly observed de facto 
compensation for work in marital household production is that breadwinning spouses 
share their income with spouses who manage the home, implying compensation at half 
of the employed spouse’s hourly wage. Not inconsistent with this interpretation, Susan 
Moller Okin advocates that each spouse receive half of any paycheck earned for work 
performed outside the household. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE 
FAMILY 180-81 (1989). 
27.  For instance, according to Ellickson, in 1980, almost 70% of Bucks County, 
Pennsylvania, deeds named a husband and wife as co-grantees. Robert C. Ellickson, 
Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 
226, 261 (2006), available at 
http://yalelawjournal.org/116/2/226_robert_c_ellickson.html. According to a 2005 
survey by the National Association of Realtors (NAR), 68% of all homebuyers were 
couples. See id. at 261 n.125. 
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